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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the problem of learning a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in strongly monotone games. First,
we propose a novel continuous-time solution algorithm that uses regular projections and first-order information. As second
main contribution, we design a data-driven variant of the former algorithm where each agent estimates their individual pseudo-
gradient via zero-order information, namely, measurements of their individual cost function values, as typical of extremum
seeking control. Third, we generalize our setup and results for multi-agent systems with nonlinear dynamics. Finally, we apply
our algorithms to connectivity control in robotic sensor networks and distributed wind farm optimization.
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1 Introduction
Multi-agent optimization problems and games with self-
interested decision makers or agents appear in many
engineering applications, such as demand-side man-
agement in smart grids [42], [47], charging/discharging
coordination for plug-in electric vehicles [37], [23], ther-
mostatically controlled loads [33], [34], [24] and robotic
formation control [35]. Typically, in these games, the
cost functions and the constraints of the agents are cou-
pled together, e.g. due to common congestion penalties
and shared resource capacity, respectively. Since the
agents are self-interested, their interaction might be un-
stable. Thus, one main research area is that of finding
(seeking) agent decisions that are self-enforceable, e.g.
decisions such that no agent has an incentive to devi-
ate from - the so-called Generalized Nash equilibrium
(GNE) [16]. From a control-theoretic perspective, in the
presence of dynamical agents, the main challenge is to
design distributed, possibly almost decentralized, con-
trol laws that ensure both the convergence of the agent
decisions to a GNE and the asymptotic stability of the
equilibrium for the coupled agent dynamics.
Literature review: The literature on generalized Nash
equilibrium problems (GNEPs) is vast - see [16] for a
survey. Traditional GNE seeking approaches assume
? This work was partially supported by the ERC un-
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that the agents have complete game information, which
requires the exchange of large amounts of data over a
communication network. Thus, one prominent research
focus in recent years has been on semi-decentralized
algorithms in which the agents have very limited game
information. The class of aggregative games is naturally
appealed to such a scenario, since each agent has a cost
function which depends on his own decision and on an
aggregate (e.g. average) of the decisions of the other
agents. The GNEP in aggregative games can be effi-
ciently solved via semi-decentralized algorithms where
the aggregate variable is broadcasted by a central coor-
dinator [4], [5], or via distributed algorithms where the
agents locally estimate the aggregate variable [29], [19],
[7]. Continuous-time GNE seeking algorithm have been
recently proposed as well, all with projections onto the
state-dependent tangent cone of the local constraints
[11], [8].
We note that in most of the literature, GNE seeking
algorithms are for static agents, i.e., where the agent
costs instantaneously reflect the chosen decisions. How-
ever, this is not the case when the cost functions depend
on the internal states of the agents and not on their
decisions (control inputs). Let us refer to this class of
agents as dynamical agents. The two main approaches
to reach a GNE for dynamical agents are passivity-based
first-order algorithms and payoff-based zero-order algo-
rithms. By using a passivity property, in [18], [46], Pavel
and co-authors design a control law that guarantees
convergence to a Nash equilibrium (NE) in a multi-
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agent system with single and multi-integrator dynamics
over a time-invariant network. With the same goal,
in [12], De Persis and Grammatico relax the network
connectivity assumption in [18] by designing a network
weight adaptation scheme. In [8], the authors extend
the convergence results to GNEPs for the first time. In
payoff-based algorithms, each agent can only measure
the value of their own cost function, but does not know
its analytic form. Most of such algorithms are designed
for NEPs with static agents with finite action spaces, e.g.
[22], [38], [40]. In the case of continuous action spaces,
the measurements of the cost functions are often used to
estimate the pseudo-gradients. Perhaps the most popu-
lar class of control algorithms that exploits this principle
is that of extremum seeking control (ESC). The main
idea is to use perturbation signals to “excite” the cost
function and estimate its gradient. Since the first gen-
eral proof of convergence [31], there has been a strong
research effort to extend the original ESC approach
[51], [20], as well as to conceive diverse variants, e.g. [13]
and [25]. ESC was used for NE seeking in [17] where
the proposed ESC algorithm is proven to converge to a
neighborhood of a NE for nonlinear dynamical agents.
The results are extended in [36] to include stochastic
perturbation signals. In [45], Poveda and Teel propose a
framework for the synthesis of a hybrid controller which
could also be used for NEPs with nonlinear dynamical
agents.Unfortunately, all the available ESC algorithms
cannot be used for GNE learning/seeking.The main
technical issue is the primal-dual Lagrangian reformu-
lation of the GNEP, which is necessary to decouple
the coupling constraints, does not preserve the strong
monotonicity of the (extended) pseudo-gradient, the
usual background assumption in the literature. This is
an important technical challenge and in fact there is still
no research on data-driven (zero-order) GNE learning
in monotone games for nonlinear dynamical agents.
Contribution: Motivated by the above literature and
open research problem, to the best of knowledge, we con-
sider and solve for the first time the problem of learning
a GNE in monotone games with nonlinear dynamical
agents. Specifically, our main technical contributions
are summarized next:
• We design a novel, full-information, semi-decentralized
continuous-time GNE seeking algorithm, which uses
projections onto fixed convex sets instead of projec-
tions onto state-dependent tangent cones as in [8]. In
this way, the state flow is Lipschitz continuous and
admits solutions in the classical sense. We overcome
the lack of strong monotonicity of the primal-dual
pseudo-gradient thanks to a suitable preconditioning
of the operators defining the optimality conditions.
• We design an extremum seeking scheme that learns
GNEs in (strongly) monotone games with static
agents who perform local computations and commu-
nicate with a central coordinator only. Differently
from [25], where the authors consider an optimization
problem, we consider a noncooperative game. Fur-
thermore, we prove that, with a time-scale separation,
our algorithm learns GNEs in (strongly) monotone
games with nonlinear dynamical agents.
We also apply for the first time semi-decentralized GNE
learning to the robot connectivity problem and to wind
farm optimization.
Notation: R denotes the set of real numbers. For a
matrix A ∈ Rn×m, A> and ‖A‖ denote its transpose
and maximum singular value respectively. For vec-
tors x, y ∈ Rn, x>y and ‖x‖ denote the Euclidean
inner product and norm, respectively. We denote the
unit ball set as B := {x ∈ RN | ‖x‖ ≤ 1}. Given N
vectors x1, . . . , xN , possibly of different dimensions,
col (x1, . . . xN ) :=
[
x>1 , . . . , x
>
N
]>
. Collective vectors
are defined as x := col (x1, . . . , xN ) and for each
i = 1, . . . , N , x−i := col (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xN ).
Given N matrices A1, A2, . . . , AN , diag (A1, . . . , AN )
denotes the block diagonal matrix with Ai on its diag-
onal. For a function v : Rn × Rm → R differentiable in
the first argument, we denote the partial gradient vector
as ∇xv(x, y) :=
[
∂v(x,y)
∂x1
>
, . . . , ∂v(x,y)∂xN
>]> ∈ Rn. Maxi-
mal and minimal eigenvalues of matrix A are denoted
as σmax(A) and σmin(A) respectively. The mapping
projS : Rn → S denotes the projection onto a closed con-
vex set S, i.e., projS(v) := argminy∈S ‖y − v‖. The set-
valued mapping NS : Rn ⇒ Rn denotes the normal cone
operator for the set S ⊆ Rn, i.e., NS(x) = ∅ if x /∈ S,{
v ∈ Rn| supz∈S v>(z − x) ≤ 0
}
otherwise. Id is the
identity operator. In is the identity matrix of dimension
n and 0n is vector column of n zeros. The non-negative
orthant is defined as {≥ 0} := {v ∈ Rn | v ≥ 0n}.
For a set M := {1, . . . ,M} and a vector-valued func-
tion φ := col ((φi(·))i∈M) : R → RM , we denote
D+φ(t) := col
(
(lim suph→0+
φi(t+h)−φi(t)
h )i∈M
)
.
2 Multi-agent dynamical systems
We consider a multi-agent system withN agents indexed
by i ∈ I = {1, 2, . . . , N}, each with the following dy-
namics:
x˙i = fi(xi, ui), (1a)
yi = hi(xi,x−i), (1b)
where xi ∈ Xi ⊂ Rni is the state variable, ui ∈ Ωi ∈ Rmi
is the control input (decision variable), yi ∈ R is
the output variable which evaluates the cost function
hi : Rni × Rn−i → R, and fi : Xi → Rni is the
state flow mapping. Let us also define n :=
∑
ni and
n−i :=
∑
j 6=i nj .
To ensure the existence and uniqueness of the solutions
to the state equations, we make a common assumption
in the nonlinear system literature [28, Thm. 3.3]:
2
Assumption 1 (Existence and uniqueness) For
each i ∈ I, fi is locally Lipschitz continuous on Xi×Ωi,
where Xi is a compact set such that any solution to (1a)
with xi(t0) ∈ Xi, lies entirely in Xi. 2
Furthermore, we assume that the decision variables of
the agents are subject to local constraints ui ∈ Ωi and
coupling constraints Au ≤ b, where A ∈ Rq×m, b ∈ Rq,
and u := col ((ui)i∈I) collects all the control inputs. Let
us denote the collection of local constraints as
Ω := Ω1 × · · · × ΩN . (2)
As the the decision variables are also coupled together,
the overall feasible decision set U is contained in Ω, i.e.
U := Ω ∩ {u ∈ Rm | Au ≤ b} , (3)
Let us also denote the feasible set of each agent i as
Ui(u−i) := Ωi ∩ {ui ∈ Rmi | Au ≤ b} . (4)
A common assumption amongst the extremum seeking
literature (for example [31, Ass. 2.1], [26, Equ. 3], [45,
Ass. 2]) is the existence of the steady-state mapping.
Standing Assumption 1 (Steady-state mapping)
For each i ∈ I, there is a differentiable mapping
pii : Rmi → Rni (called the steady-state mapping) such
that for every ui ∈ Ωi, it holds that fi(pii(ui), ui) = 0.
2
By using the previous definition, let us also define the
collective steady-state mappings
pi(u) := col
(
(pii(ui))i∈I
)
,
pi−i(u−i) := col
(
(pij(uj))j∈I\{i}
)
. (5)
In this paper, we assume that the goal of each agent is
to minimize its own steady-state cost function, i.e.,
∀i ∈ I : min
ui∈Ui(u−i)
Ji(ui,u−i), (6)
where
Ji(ui,u−i) := hi(pi(ui), pi−i(u−i)), (7)
which depends on decision variables of other agents as
well. From a game-theoretic perspective, we consider
the problem to compute a generalized Nash equilibrium
(GNE), as formalized next.
Definition 1 (Generalized Nash equilibrium)
A set of control actions u∗ := col (u∗i )i∈I is a generalized
Nash equilibrium if, for all i ∈ I,
u∗i ∈ argmin
vi∈Ωi
Ji
(
vi,u
∗
−i
)
s.t.
(
vi,u
∗
−i
) ∈ U . (8)
with U as in (3) and Ji as in (7). 2
In plain words, a set of inputs is a GNE if no agent can
improve its steady-state cost function by unilaterally
changing its input. To ensure the existence of the GNE,
we postulate the following basic assumption [15, Thm.
2]:
Standing Assumption 2 (Regularity) For each i ∈
I, the function Ji in (7) is continuous; the function
Ji (·,u−i) is convex for every u−i. For each i ∈ I, the
set Ωi is non-empty, closed and convex; U is non-empty
and satisfies Slater’s constraint qualification. 2
More precisely, in this paper we focus on a subclass of
GNE called variational GNE (v-GNE) [15, Def. 3.11]. A
collective decisionu∗ is a v-GNE in (8) if and only if there
exists a dual variable λ ∈ Rq such that the following
KKT conditions are satisfied [15, Th. 4.8]:
0m ∈ F (x∗) +A>λ∗ + NΩ (x∗) (9a)
0q ∈ − (Ax∗ − b) + Nq≥0 (λ∗) . (9b)
By stacking the partial gradients ∇uiJi(ui,u−i) in to
single vector, we form the pseudo-gradient mapping
F (u) := col
(
(∇uiJi (ui,u−i))i∈I
)
. (10)
We assume that there exists a central coordinator who is
capable of bidirectional communication on a star-shaped
network with the agents, which is a frequent assump-
tion in semi-decentralized algorithms [5], [6]. The cen-
tral coordinator is tasked with computation of the dual
variables. For ease of notation, we index the coordinator
with 0 and define I0 := I ∪ {0}.
Let us postulate additional common assumptions ([11,
Std. Ass. 2], [12, Ass. 1]) in order to assure the conver-
gence of the algorithm we propose latter on.
Standing Assumption 3 (Well-behavedness) For
each i ∈ I, Ji in (7) is twice differentiable, Lipschitz
continuous, and its gradient ∇Ji is `-Lipschitz continu-
ous, with ` > 0. The pseudo-gradient mapping F in (10)
is µ-strongly monotone, i.e., for any pair u,v ∈ Rn,
(u− v)>(F (u)− F (v)) ≥ µ‖u− v‖, with µ > 0. 2
Another common assumption is (local) exponential sta-
bility of the equilibrium points pii(ui), under constant
input (u˙i = 0) [31, Ass. 2.2], [17, Ass. 4.2]. Thus, with
the change of coordinates zi := xi−pii(ui), we also adopt
the following assumption throughout the paper:
Standing Assumption 4 (Lyapunov stability)
For each i ∈ I, there is a smooth Lyapunov function,
zi 7→ Vi(zi, ui), with Lipschitz continuous partial deriva-
3
tives, i.e. for every constant ui ∈ Ui, it holds that
αi‖zi‖2 ≤ Vi(zi, ui) ≤ αi‖zi‖2 (11a)
∂Vi
∂zi
(zi, ui)
>f(zi + pii(ui), ui) ≤ −κi‖zi‖2 (11b)
∂Vi
∂zi
(0, ui) = 0 (11c)
for some positive constants αi, αi and κi. Moreover, for
every constant ui ∈ Ui, it holds that
∂Vi
∂ui
(0, ui) = 0. 2 (12)
3 Generalized Nash Equilibrium seeking for
static agents
Let us start from the case of static agents to highlight
the proposed algorithm and its integration with the zero-
oder gradient scheme.
Assumption 2 (Static agents)
For each i ∈ I, xi = ui (in place of (1a)). 2
We propose two control schemes for GNE seeking with
static agents. In the first, the agents have perfect infor-
mation about the decisions of other agents and know the
analytic expression of their partial gradient. The second
scheme is data-driven, i.e. the agents have access to the
output of their own cost function only.
3.1 Gradient-based case
In our first GNE seeking algorithm, each agent updates
their decision, ui, based on decisions of all other agents
and the dual variable. A central coordinator updates the
dual variable and broadcasts it amongst the agents:
∀i ∈ I : u˙i = −ui + projΩi
(
ui − γi(∇uiJi(u) +A>i λ)
)
λ˙ = −λ+ proj≥0(λ+ γ0(Au− b+ 2Au˙)),
or in collective form[
u˙
λ˙
]
= −
[
u
λ
]
+
[
projΩ
(
u− Γ(F (u) +A>λ))
proj≥0(λ+ γ0(Au− b+ 2Au˙))
]
,
(13)
where λ ∈ Rq, (γi) i∈I are the step sizes chosen by the
agents; Γ = diag ((γiImi)i∈I) and γ0 is the step size
chosen by the central coordinator. Now we state our first
theorem:
Theorem 1 (v-GNE seeking)
Let the Standing assumptions and Assumption 2 hold and
let (u(t), λ(t))t≥0 be the solution to (13). Then, there ex-
ist small enough (γi)i∈I0 such that the pair (u(t), λ(t))t≥0
converges to some (u∗, λ∗) ∈ U × R≥0, where u∗ is the
variational generalized Nash equilibrium of the game in
(8). 2
PROOF. See Appendix A. 
Remark 1 The algorithm in (13) is semi-decentralized,
meaning that the update and the broadcast of the dual
variable is managed by a central coordinator. A fully dis-
tributed variant, where each agent has their own copy of
the dual variable and their consensus is imposed, can be
derived similarly to [8, Sec. 3].
3.2 Data-driven case
In the limited information case, we consider that the
agents have access to the cost output only. We emphasize
that in this case, they neither know the actions of the
other agents, nor they know the analytic expressions of
their partial gradients. In fact, this is a standard setup
used in extremum seeking ([31], [26], [45] among others).
However, the agents can communicate with a central
coordinator, to whom they send their decision variable
and its derivative.
Let us first evaluate the time derivative of the cost output
li = Ji(ui,u−i) along the trajectories of u:
l˙i = θ
0
i (u) + θ
1
i (u)u˙i = [1, u˙
>
i ]θi(u), (14)
where we define
θ0i = θ
0
i (u) := ∇u−iJi(ui,u−i)>u˙−i (15)
θ1i = θ
1
i (u) := ∇uiJi(ui,u−i)>. (16)
θi = θi(u) := [θ
0
i , θ
1>
i ] (17)
The variable θ0i measures the influence of the decision
variables of the other agents on the cost output of agent
i. The variable θ1i measures the effect of the decision
variable of agent i on the cost output li, which is needed
for (13). To estimate the local θ0i and θ
1
i , we use a time-
varying parameter estimation approach, as proposed in
[26] for centralized optimization. Let us provide a basic
intuition first.
Let lˆi and θˆi be estimations of the output li and the
variable θi respectively and let ei = li − lˆi be the es-
timation error. Then, the estimator model in (14) for
agent i is given by
˙ˆ
li = [1, u˙
>
i ]θˆi +Kiei + c
>
i
˙ˆ
θi, (18)
where Ki is a free design parameter. Note that the first
two terms on the right-hand side resemble high gain ob-
server schemes [44]. As the structure of the problem does
not directly allow the use of high gain observers, it is
necessary to introduce some other dynamics into the es-
timation. This is the primary role of the third term in
(18). Therefore, the dynamics of ci(t) are choosen as
c˙>i = −Kic>i + [1, u˙>i ]. (19)
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Let us also introduce an auxiliary variable ηi = ei−c>i θ˜i,
with dynamicsD+ηi = −Kiηi−c>i D+θ, and its estimate
ηˆi, with dynamics
˙ˆηi = −Kiηˆi. (20)
It is also necessary to define a symmetric, positive defi-
nite matrix variable Σi ∈ R(mi+1)×(mi+1) with dynam-
ics given by
Σ˙i = cic
>
i − ρiΣi + σiI Σi(0) = Σ0i , (21)
where ρi, σi and Σ
0
i are free design parameters. We note
that, originally, in [1], Σ˙i = cic
>
i , but this proved to
be inconvenient in practical implementations, as the el-
ements of Σi grow unbounded. Instead, as in (21), dy-
namics of Σi behave as a first-order system. The third
term is added so that the matrix is always invertible.
Equations (18)-(21) form the parameter update law pre-
sented in [1]:
˙ˆ
θi = ΠΘi
(
θˆi,Σ
−1
i (ci(ei − ηˆi)− σiθˆi)
)
, (22)
where ΠΘi(θˆ, v) denotes the projection of the vector v
onto the tangent cone of the set Θi at θˆ, as defined by
Equation 2.14 in [43]. This implies that if the starting
value θˆi(0) is in Θi, so is θˆi(t). The set Θi represents
the expected (possible) values of θi. Let us also define
Θ := Θ1 × · · · ×ΘN .
We are finally ready to propose our semi-decentralized
v-GNE learning algorithm:
∀i ∈ I : u˙i = −ui + projΩi
(
ui − γi(θˆ1i +A>i λ) + di
)
,
λ˙ = −λ+ proj≥0(λ+ γ0(Au− b+ 2Au˙)),
where A>i represents the ith matrix row of A
>, which
contains the constraints of agent i and di represents the
perturbation signal of agent i. In collective form, it can
be written as[
u˙
λ˙
]
= −
[
u
λ
]
+
projΩ (u− Γ(θˆ1 +A>λ) + d)
proj≥0(λ+ γ0(Au− b+ 2Au˙))
 ,
(23)
where θˆ
1
:= col
((
θˆ1i
)
i∈I
)
. As in [26, Ass. 5], for the
parameter estimation scheme to converge, we postu-
late a persistency of excitation (PE) assumption for all
agents.
Assumption 3 (Persistence of excitation)
For each i ∈ I, there are positive constants αi and Ti
such that∫ t+Ti
t
ci(τ)ci(τ)
>dτ ≥ αiI, for all t > 0, (24)
where ci is the solution to (19). 2
We conclude the section with the convergence result.
For any initial condition of the decision variables, there
exist gains such that the control variables converge to
an arbitrarily small neighborhood of the v-GNE.
Theorem 2 (v-GNE static learning)
Let the Standing Assumptions and Assumptions 2 and
3 hold and let (s(t) := (ηˆ(t), θˆ(t),u(t), λ(t)))t≥0 be the
closed-loop solution to (18)–(21), (23). Then, for any
compact set K and any ε > 0, there exist small enough
parameters ( 1Ki ,
1
ρi
, σi, γi)i∈I and γ0, such that for ev-
ery solution with s(0) ∈ K, u(t) converges to the set
{u∗} + εB, where u∗ is a variational generalized Nash
equilibrium of the game in (8). 2
PROOF. See Appendix B. 
4 Generalized Nash equilibrium learning for dy-
namical agents
In this section, we propose a control scheme for gener-
alized Nash equilibrium learning for dynamical agents.
We consider a data-driven scenario only, i.e. the agents
have access to the cost output measurements and the
information that is given to them by a central coordi-
nator. They are not aware of the analytic expression
of their steady-state cost function, nor of their pseudo-
gradient, nor can they observe the states and decisions
of the other agents.
For the multi-agent dynamical system


x˙1
...
x˙N
 = x˙ =

f1(x1, u1)
...
fN (xN , uN )
 = f(x,u), (25)
where  > 0 is a time scale separation constant, with
the objective of reaching a neighborhood of a v-GNE,
we propose the same control law as in (23), with the dis-
tinction that θˆ
1
is estimated by a parameter estimation
scheme (18) – (22), where we collect the measurements
of the output yi in (1b) instead of Ji(ui,u−i) directly.
Thus, the estimation error is hereby redefined as
ei = yi − lˆi. (26)
We conclude the section with the most general theoret-
ical result of the paper, namely, the convergence of the
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closed-loop dynamics to a neighborhood of a v-GNE of
the game in (6).
Theorem 3 (v-GNE dynamic learning)
Let the Standing Assumptions and Assumptions 2 and
3 hold and let (s(t) := (ηˆ(t), θˆ(t),x(t),u(t), λ(t)))t≥0 be
the closed-loop solution to (18)–(21), (23), (25), (26).
Then, for any compact set K and any ε > 0, there exist
small enough parameters ( 1Ki ,
1
ρi
, σi, γi)i∈I , γ0 and  such
that every solution with s(0) ∈ K, (x(t),u(t)) converges
to an ε neighborhood of some (pi(u(t)),u∗), where u∗ is
a variational generalized Nash equilibrium of the game
in (8). 2
PROOF. See Appendix C. 
5 Illustrative applications
5.1 Connectivity control in robotic swarms
The problem of connectivity control has been consid-
ered in [50] as a Nash equilibrium problem. In many
practical scenarios, multi-agent systems, besides their
primary objective, are designed to uphold certain con-
nectivity as their secondary objective. In what follows,
we consider a similar problem in which each agent is
tasked with finding a source of an unknown signal while
maintaining certain connectivity. Unlike [50], we require
the existence of a central coordinator and we allow for
coupled restrictions on the decisions variables. Addi-
tionally, we model the agents as unicycles with setpoint
regulators, which does not require a constant angular
velocity as in [50].
Consider a multi-agent system consisting of unicycle
vehicles, indexed by i ∈ {1, . . . N}, with the following
dynamics:
x˙i = vi cos θi,
y˙i = vi sin θi,
θ˙i = ωi, (27)
where xi, yi, θi represent the state variables, and vi, ωi
represent the control inputs. Each unicycle implements
the following feedback controller used for setpoint regu-
lation:
vi = K
1
i ·Ri · cosφi,
ωi = −K2i · sin(2φi)−K2i · φi, (28)
for someK1i ,K
2
i > 0, which was studied in [32]. A graph-
ical representation of the variables Ri and φi is shown
on Figure 1. Therefore, we rewrite the closed-loop non-
Ri
φi
(uxi , u
y
i )
x
y
(xi, yi)
Fig. 1. Variables of the unicycle reference controller.
linear dynamics as

x˙i
y˙i
φ˙i
 =

−K1i ‖ri − ui‖ cosφi cos
(
φi − arctan yi
xi
)
−K1i ‖ri − ui‖ cosφi sin
(
φi − arctan yi
xi
)
−K2i φi
 ,
(29)
where ri = col (xi, yi) and ui = col (u
x
i , u
y
i ) is the in-
put of the transformed system, which represents the
coordinates of the setpoint. For each i, the steady-state
mapping is then given by pii(ui) = col (ui, 0).
Each agent is tasked with locating a source of a unique
unknown signal. The strength of all signals abides by
the inverse-square law, i.e. proportional to 1/r2. There-
fore, the inverse of the signal strength can be used in the
cost function. Additionally, the agents must not drift
apart from each other too much, as they should provide
quick assistance to each other in case of critical failure.
This is enforced in two ways: by incorporating the signal
strength of the fellows agents in the cost functions and
by communicating with the central coordinator. Thus,
we design the cost output and position constraints as
∀i ∈ I :
{
yi = ‖ri − rsi ‖2 + c
∑
j∈I−i ‖ri − rj‖2,∥∥col ((ui − uj)j∈I−i)∥∥∞ ≤ b (30)
where I−i := I \ {i}, c, b > 0 and rsi represents
the position of the source assigned to agent i. The
safe traversing area is described by a rectangle:
[xmin, xmax]× [ymin, ymax].
For our numerical simulations, we choose the param-
eters as in Table 1. We randomly choose for each
of the agents the following perturbation frequen-
cies: (ω11, ω
2
1) = (5.11, 6.38), (ω
1
2, ω
2
2) = (4.42, 5.16),
(ω13, ω
2
3) = (10.59, 11.91), (ω
1
4, ω
2
4) = (14.65, 16.12). We
run simulations for different values of perturbation am-
plitudes in range [0.1, 0.5] and different values of the
frequency factor kω in range [0.17, 1]. The numerical
results are illustrated on Figures 2, 3 and 4. In Figure 2,
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Problem setup
N xmin xmax ymin ymax
4 -16 16 -6 6
rs1 r
s
2 r
s
3 r
s
4 (c, b)
(−4,−8) (−12,−3) (1, 7) (16, 8) (0.04, 14)
Parameter estimation scheme
Ki k
σ
i σi Σi(0) ω
j
i
100 100 10−6 0.1I kωω
j
i
System stabilization and extremum seeking
γi γ0  K
i
1 K
i
2
0.002 0.002 0.1 3 6
Table 1
Simulation parameters for connectivity control.
Fig. 2. Distance of the final average steady-state trajectory
from the v-GNE for agent 4.
we see that smaller perturbations and frequency factors
bring the system closer towards the v-GNE; however in
Figure 3, we see that the convergence rate slows down
significantly. Thus, there is a trade-off between conver-
gence speed and closeness to the solution. In Figure
4, we see a representative example of agent trajecto-
ries for ‖di‖ = 0.49. We note that the trajectories of
agents 1 and 3 have saturate in their decision variables,
while agents 2 and 4 are limited mostly by the coupling
constraints.
5.2 Wind farm optimization
As one of the main sources of renewable energy, wind
farms and their optimization has been addressed exten-
sively from different perspectives such as power tracking
of single turbines [30], [10], power tracking via extremum
seeking [21], power tracking with load reduction [49],
[48], distributed optimization of wind farms [41], [39], [2]
Fig. 3. Hours required to enter a ball of size ε = 1.5 centered
around the v-GNE for agent 4.
Fig. 4. State trajectories in the x − y plane for the case of
di = 0.49. Circle symbols represent locations of the sources,
while the × symbols represent locations of the v-GNE.
and distributed optimization via extremum seeking [14].
While in the power tracking case, often the torque or
some other related variable is taken as the control input,
in the distributed optimization case, the axial induction
factor (AIL) is usually taken as the control input.
In what follows, we consider a similar problem in which
a wind farm tries to maximize its power output with AIL
as the control input. The control variables are subject
to local constraints (feasible values of AIL). Also, we
require that the turbines experience a similar amount of
mechanical stress. In order to do that, we impose that
AILs of a row of wind turbines cannot differ to much
from AILs of the succeeding row, which introduces cou-
pling constraints to the optimization problem. Unlike
the previously mentioned literature on distributed wind
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farm optimization, here we also allow for AIL dynamics
in order to reflect the turbine time constant and its ef-
fect on the power output. One possible way of solving
the problem would be via global optimization, where
a central coordinator would minimize a global cost
function and send AIL commands to the turbines. To
avoid having a single critical node for computation and
communication, an alternative approach is to pose the
problem as a potential game, where the cost function of
the turbines are “aligned” to a global utility function.
In our case, the potential function would be the sum of
all power outputs. We choose that the individual cost
functions are equal to the potential function and each of
the agents minimizes their cost function on their own,
with limited information from the central coordinator.
In this setup, a v-GNE corresponds to an optimal solu-
tion of the global power maximization problem.
Technically speaking, we consider N wind turbines, in-
dexed by i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, each with the following AIL
dynamics and power output:
a˙i = − 1τ (ai − ui) (31)
yi = −
∑
i∈I
Pi(a) = − 12ρA
∑
i∈I
CP (ai)Vi(a)
3, (32)
where ai represent the state variable, ui represent the
control input, namely the AIL reference, yi is the mea-
sured power output of the wind farm, which is broad-
casted by the central coordinator, ρ is the air density, A
is the surface area encompassed by the blades of a sin-
gle turbine, CP (ai) := ai(1−ai)2 is the power efficiency
coefficient and Vi is the average wind speed experienced
by wind turbine i, as in [39, Equ. 5]:
Vi(a) = U∞
(
1− 2
√∑
(ajcji)
2
)
. (33)
The wind turbines are placed in R rows and C columns
with coordinates xi and their indices can be written as
i = ic + irC, where ic ∈ {1, . . . , C} and ir ∈ {0, . . . , R−
1}. They are tasked to maximize the wind farm power
output under local constraints ai ∈ [amin, amax] and cou-
pling constraints |ai − aj | ≤ b for all i, j, where it holds
that jr = ir + 1.
For our numerical simulation, we choose a similar setup
as in [39]. The wind farm setup geometric setup is shown
in Figure 5 and the following parameters are chosen:
ρ = 1.225, U∞ = 8, τ = 10, γi = γ0 = 0.05,  = 0.005,
b = 0.03, amin = 0.1, amax =
1
3 . We take the same pa-
rameter estimation scheme as in previous numerical sim-
ulation, apart for the perturbation frequencies that we
randomly choose in the interval [3, 11] and perturbation
amplitudes that we take as ‖di‖ = 0.01. All initial con-
ditions, apart for ai, were set to zero. The initial condi-
tion for ai was set to
1
3 , which corresponds to the greedy
strategy in [39]. In our simulations, we use three different
wind directions. In the time interval [0, 50000), the wind
560m
560 m 80 m
~v1 ~v2 ~v3
Fig. 5. Layout of the wind turbines and the wind directions.
Fig. 6. Power generation with the proposed algorithm (solid
line) compared to the greedy power output setpoint (dashed
red) and the global optimal power setpoint (dot-dashed
black).
was blowing with speed direction vector ~v1 = (2,−1);
in the time interval [50000, 100000), the wind was blow-
ing with the speed direction vector ~v2 = (0,−1); and
finally, in the time interval [100000, 150000], the wind
was blowing with speed direction vector ~v3 = (−1,−1).
We assume that the wind turbines instantly adjust their
orientation towards the wind direction as this process is
relatively fast compared with the GNE learning process.
The simulation results are shown on Figure 6. We can
see that the wind turbines reach a neighborhood of the
v-GNE, even with the delay introduced by AIL dynam-
ics.
6 Conclusion
Generalized Nash equilibrium problems with nonlinear
dynamical agents can be solved via a preconditioned
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forward-backward algorithm that uses estimates of the
pseudo-gradient mapping if it is strongly monotone and
Lipschitz continuous, and if the dynamical agents have
a certain exponential stability property. Regular projec-
tions enable the use of a parameter estimation scheme.
Numerical simulations show that there is trade-off be-
tween closeness to the equilibrium solution and the speed
of convergence.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
To prove the convergence of the algorithm, we show that
equation in (23) is equivalent to a continuous-time pre-
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conditioned forward-backward algorithm, whose conver-
gence is proven using well-known properties of monotone
operators. First, we show the equivalence. Let us denote
ω = col(u, λ). We write Equation (23) as:
ω˙ = −ω + projΩ×≥0
(
ω + Γ
[
−F (u)−A>λ
Au− b+ 2Au˙
])
,
(A.1)
where Γ = diag (Γ, γ0Iq). Next, by the property of pro-
jection operator in [3, Prep. 6.47], Equation (A.1) reads
as
ω˙ + ω = (Id +ΓNΩ×≥0)−1
(
ω + Γ
[
−F (u)−A>λ
Au− b+ 2Au˙
])
,
which is equivalent to the inclusion
ω˙ + ω + ΓNΩ×≥0(ω˙ + ω) 3 ω + Γ
[
−F (u)−A>λ
Au− b+ 2Au˙
]
.
(A.2)
When the elements of the last matrix product in (A.2)
are rearranged and the equation is premultiplied by Γ−1,
the equations read as follows:
ω˙ + ω + ΓNΩ×≥0(ω˙ + ω) 3 Γ˜ω +
[
−ΓF (u)
−γ0b
]
+
[
0
γ02Au˙
]
⇔
Γ−1(ω˙ + ω) + NΩ×≥0(ω˙ + ω) 3 Φˆω +
[
−F (u)
−b
]
+
[
0
2Au˙
]
,
(A.3)
where we have used the notation Γ˜ =
[
Im −ΓA>
γ0A Iq
]
and
Φˆ =
[
Γ−1 −A>
A γ−10 Iq
]
. Now, since
[
Γ−1 −A>
A γ−10 Iq
]
ω +
[
0
2Au˙
]
⇔
[
Γ−1 −A>
−A γ−10 Iq
]
ω +
[
0 0
2A 0
]
ω +
[
0 0
2A 0
]
ω˙ ⇔
[
Γ−1 −A>
−A γ−10 Iq
]
ω +
[
0 0
2A 0
]
(ω + ω˙)⇔
Φω + Aˆ(ω + ω˙), (A.4)
Equation (A.3) reads as
Γ−1(ω˙ + ω) + NΩ×≥0(ω˙ + ω) 3
Φω +
[
−F (u)
−b
]
+ Aˆ(ω + ω˙). (A.5)
Next, the following expression is valid for the matrices:
Γ−1 − Aˆ = Φ +
[
0 A>
−A 0
]
= Φ + Ψ. (A.6)
From Equations (A.5) and (A.6), it follows
Φ(ω˙ + ω) + Ψ(ω + ω˙) + NΩ×≥0(ω˙ + ω) 3 Φω −
[
F (u)
b
]
⇔
(ω˙ + ω) + Φ−1 (NΩ×≥0 + Ψ) (ω˙ + ω) 3 ω − Φ−1
[
F (u)
b
]
.
(A.7)
By inverting the operator on the left side of the previous
expression, we finally arrive to desired equation:
ω˙ = −ω
+
(
Id +Φ−1 (NΩ×≥0 + Ψ)
)−1(
ω − Φ−1
[
F (u)
b
])
⇔
ω˙ = −ω + (Id +Φ−1A)−1 ◦ (ω − Φ−1B(ω))⇔
ω˙ = −ω + JΦ−1A
(
ω − Φ−1B(ω)) . (A.8)
Equation (A.8) represents a forward-backward algo-
rithm preconditioned by matrix Φ−1. Fixed points of
the operator on the right-hand side of (A.8) ([3, Prep.
26.1, (iv)(a)], [52, Lemma 1], (9a), (9b)) represent Gen-
eralized Nash equilibria that are the solutions to the
game in (6). Before proving convergence, we have to
prove an additional result.
Lemma 1 Let T = (Id +A)−1 ◦ (Id−B), where A is
maximally monotone. Then it holds:
(Tx− x∗)>(x− Tx) ≥ (Tx− x∗)>(Bx− Bx∗).
for all (x, x∗) ∈ dom(T )× fix(T ). 2
PROOF. Let us denote x∗ = Tx∗ = JAy∗ as the fixed
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point of operator T . Then it holds:
(Tx− x∗)>(x− Tx− (Bx− Bx∗))
= (Tx− x∗)>(x− Bx− Tx+ x∗ − (x∗ − Bx∗))
= (Tx− x∗)>(y − Tx+ x∗ − y∗)
= (JAy − JAy∗)>((Id−JA)y − (Id−JA)y∗)
≥ 0, (A.9)
where the last equation holds due to properties of firmly
nonexpansive operators. 
Now we denote A˜ = Φ−1A, B˜ = Φ−1B and T =
(Id +A˜)−1 ◦ (Id−B˜). Then, the dynamics in (A.8) read
as
ω˙ = −ω + Tω. (A.10)
We propose the Lyapunov function candidate
V (ω) =
1
2
‖ω − ω∗‖2, (A.11)
where ω∗ is a fixed point of operator T . Its derivative
along the trajectory in (A.8) is then
V˙ (ω) = −(ω − ω∗)>(ω − Tω)
= −‖(ω − Tω)‖2 − (Tω − ω∗)>(ω − Tω)
= −‖ω˙‖2 − (Tω − ω∗)>(ω − Tω) (A.12)
From Lemma 1, it follows that
V˙ (ω) ≤ −‖ω˙‖2 − (Tω − ω∗)>(B˜ω − B˜ω∗)
5 −‖ω˙‖2 − (Tω − ω)>(B˜ω − B˜ω∗)
− (ω − ω∗)>(B˜ω − B˜ω∗)
5 −‖ω˙‖2 − (Tω − ω)>Φ−1(Bω − Bω∗)
− (ω − ω∗)>Φ−1(Bω − Bω∗). (A.13)
Bounds on the eigenvalues of Φ can be estimated with
Gershgorin’s theorem. For small enough step sizes, we
denote the lower and upper bound on the eigenvalues as
σmin =
1
maxi∈I0 (γ
−1
i
)+‖A‖ and σmax =
1
mini∈I0 (γ
−1
i
)−‖A‖ ,
respectively. We bound (A.13) as
V˙ (ω) ≤− ‖ω˙‖2 + σmax‖ω˙‖‖Bω − Bω∗‖
− σmin(ω − ω∗)>(Bω − Bω∗). (A.14)
Since F (u) is strongly monotone and Lipschitz contin-
uous, it is also cocoercive [52, Lemma 5]. Therefore, the
operator B is cocoercive with constant β = µL2 . Equa-
tion (A.14) then becomes:
V˙ (ω) ≤ −‖ω˙‖2 + σmax‖ω˙‖‖Bω − Bω∗‖
− σmin
2
β‖Bω − Bω∗‖2 − σmin
2
(ω − ω∗)>(Bω − Bω∗)
≤ −1
2
‖ω˙‖2 − σmin
2
(ω − ω∗)>(Bω − Bω∗)
− 1
2
[
‖ω˙‖ ‖Bω − Bω∗‖
] [ 1 σmax
σmax βσmin
][
‖ω˙‖
‖Bω − Bω∗‖
]
(A.15)
Since, it is always possible to choose parameters γi and
γ0 small enough such that βσmin ≥ σ2max and the matrix
in (A.15) is negative definite, the last equation reads as
V˙ (ω) ≤ −1
2
‖ω˙‖2 − σmin
2
(ω − ω∗)>(Bω − Bω∗)
≤ −1
2
‖ω˙‖2 − µσmin
2
‖u˜‖2, (A.16)
where u˜ = u− u∗ and the last line follows from strong
monotonicity of F (u∗). Rest of the proof represent a
La Salle argument. As the right-hand side is a sum of
negative squares, it follows that V˙ (ω) ≤ 0 for all ω. Let
us denote ζ0 = {ω ∈ Rn+q | V˙ (ω) = 0}. Then, it holds
ζ0 ⊆ ζ1 = {ω ∈ Rn+q | ‖ω˙‖ = 0 and ‖u˜‖ = 0}. When
ω˙ = 0, from the dynamics (A.10), it follows that
ω = T (ω). (A.17)
i.e., ω ∈ fix(T ). The set ζ1 can be rewritten as
ζ1 = {(u, λ) ∈ fix(T ) | u = u∗}. As ω∗ was chosen as
an arbitrary fixed point of the operator T , it follows
that u∗ is a singleton and ζ1 = fix(T ). From the dy-
namics (A.10), it follows that the largest invariant set
is ζinv = ζ1 = fix(T ). Therefore, ζ0 ⊆ ζinv. By La Salle’s
invariance principle [28, Thm. 4.4], we conclude that the
state trajectories converge to the set ζ0, in which u = u
∗
is a singleton and it holds that col(u∗, λ) ∈ fix(T ).
B Proof of Theorem 2
Let us consider a Lyapunov function candidate of the
form V = Vθ + Vω, where Vθ represents a parameter es-
timation error and Vω represents a primal-dual conver-
gence error:
Vθ(η˜, θ˜) =
∑
i∈I
(
1
2 η˜
>
i η˜i +
1
2 θ˜
>
i Σiθ˜i
)
, (B.1)
Vω(ω) =
1
2
‖ω − ω∗‖2. (B.2)
Since we anticipate that the derivative of the projection
function does not exist on some corner points, we use
the Lyapunov theory for differential inclusions as in [9,
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Chp. 2], namely we use upper Dini derivatives (D+)
instead of regular time derivatives. For ease of notation,
we use the regular derivatives whenever they are equal
to Dini derivatives.
Outline of the proof: We first bound all of the positive
terms in D+Vθ with functions of variables (η, θˆ, ω),
then we similarly bound all of the terms in D+Vω in-
troduced by the parameter estimates. Finally, we use
the quadratic terms of D+V to show that the positive
terms are majorized by the negative terms.
Parameter estimation term: We bound the Dini deriva-
tive of Vθ similarly to [26, Thm. 1] and [27, Eq. 31] with
the only difference that we let each agent choose their
own parameters (σi,Ki, ρi). The Lyapunov derivative
reads as follows:
D+Vθ(η˜, θ˜) ≤
∑
i∈I
(
− η˜>i
(
Ki − 1
2
− k1ζi
2
)
η˜i
− 1
2
‖ei − ηi‖2 + k
Σ′
i γ1i
2
θ˜τi θ˜i +
σi
2
θ>i θi
+
1
2k1
D+θ>i D
+θi +
γ2i
2k2
D+θ>i D
+θi
)
≤− ka‖η˜‖2 − kb‖θ˜‖2 − 1
2
‖e− η‖2 + kc‖D+θ‖2
+
σ
2
‖θ‖2, (B.3)
where ka := mini
(
Ki − 12 − k1ζi2
)
, kb := mini
(
kΣ′i γ1i
2
)
,
kc := maxi
(
1
2k1
+ γ2i2k2
)
and σ := maxi σi
1 .
Next, we bound the positive terms in (B.3). The analysis
starts with θ = col
(
θ0,θ1
)
, where
θ0 := col
((
∇u−iJi (ui,u−i)> u˙−i
)
i∈I
)
:= J0(u)u˙, (B.4)
θ1 := F (u). (B.5)
We have that
‖θ0‖ ≤ ‖J0(u)‖‖u˙‖ = L0‖u˙‖,
‖θ1‖ = ‖F (u)‖ ≤ ‖F (u)− F (u∗)‖+ ‖F (u∗)‖
≤ `‖u˜‖+ ‖F (u∗)‖,
1 The term 1
2
‖e− η‖2 was omitted in [26] (look at page 4,
first column, second to last equation) and [27], as it wasn’t
required.
where L0 := maxu∈U
∥∥J0(u)∥∥ <∞, since U is bounded.
Then, we bound ‖θ‖ as follows
‖θ‖2 ≤ L02‖u˙‖2 + (`‖u˜‖+ ‖F (u∗)‖)2
5 L1‖u˙‖2 + L2‖u˜‖2 + L3‖F (u∗)‖2,
for L1 := L
02, L2 := 2`
2 and L3 = 2. In order to bound
‖D+θ‖, we observe the dini derivatives of θ0 and θ1:
‖D+θ0‖ ≤ ‖u˙>HJ0u˙‖+ ‖J0(u)D+u˙‖, (B.6)
‖D+θ1‖ = ‖∇F (u)u˙‖ ≤ L‖u˙‖, (B.7)
‖D+u˙‖ = ∥∥u˙+D+ projΩ (u− Γ(θ1 +A>λ) + d(t))∥∥
≤ ‖u˙‖+
∥∥∥D+ projΩ (u+ Γ(θˆ1 −A>λ) + d(t))∥∥∥
≤ 2‖u˙‖+ σmax(Γ)‖ ˙ˆθ1‖+ σmax(Γ)‖A‖‖λ˙‖+ ‖d˙(t)‖
Next, we bound ‖ ˙ˆθ1‖ using the estimator dynamics in
(22):
‖ ˙ˆθ‖ ≤
∑
i∈I
(‖Σ−1i ci(ei − ηi)‖+ σi‖Σ−1i ‖‖θi‖
+ σi‖Σ−1i ‖‖θ˜i‖)
On a compact set Ωc := {(ω, ηˆ, θˆ) ∈ U × Rq × RN ×
Θ | V (ω, η˜, θ˜) ≤ c}, ci and Σi are bounded, therefore,
the last equation reads as:
‖ ˙ˆθ‖ ≤ L∗3‖(e− η)‖+ L∗4‖θ‖+ L∗5‖θ˜‖,
for some positive L∗3, L
∗
4, L
∗
5. Now, bound on ‖D+u˙‖
equals to:
‖D+u˙‖ ≤ 2‖u˙‖+ σmax(Γ)L∗3‖(e− η)‖+ σmax(Γ)L∗4‖‖θ‖
+σmax(Γ)L
∗
5‖θ˜‖+ σmax(Γ)‖A‖‖λ˙‖+ ‖d˙(t)‖
(B.8)
On a compact set Ωc, u˙
>HJ0 is bounded, therefore by
combining (B.6), (B.7), (B.8) and the arithmetic mean
- quadratic mean inequality, it follows:
‖D+θ‖2 ≤ L4‖u˙‖2 + L5‖λ˙‖2 + L6‖θ‖2 + L7‖θ˜‖2
+ L8‖e− η‖2 + L9‖d˙(t)‖2,
for some positive L4 to L9. By using the previously cal-
culated bounds, D+Vθ reads as:
D+Vθ ≤ −ka‖η˜‖2 − (kb − kcL7)‖θ˜‖2
− ( 12 − kcL8) ‖e− η‖2 + (kcL4 + (σ + kcL6)L1)‖u˙‖2
+ (σ + kcL6)L2‖u˜‖2 + kcL5‖λ˙‖2 + kcL9‖d˙(t)‖2
+ (σ + kcL6)L3‖F (u∗)‖. (B.9)
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Primal-dual term: Unlike the full-information case, our
agents use the estimate θˆ
1
instead of F (u) in the control
law in (23). Therefore, by adding and subtracting the
derivative of full-information case in the Dini derivative
of (B.1), we have:
D+Vω(ω) = (ω − ω∗)>
[
− ω + JΦ−1A
(
ω − Φ−1B(ω))
− projΩ×≥0
(
ω + Γ
[
−F (u)−A>λ
Au− b+ 2Au˙
])
+ projΩ×≥0
(
ω + Γ
[
−θ1 −A>λ
Au− b+ 2Au˙
]
+
[
d(t)
0
])]
≤ −1
2
‖ω˙‖2 − µσmin
2
‖u˜‖2 + σmax(Γ)‖u˜‖‖θ˜‖+ ‖u˜‖‖d(t)‖
≤ −1
2
‖ω˙‖2 −
(
µσmin
2
− σmax(Γ)
2k3
− 1
2k4
)
‖u˜‖2
+
σmax(Γ)k3
2
‖θ˜‖2 + k4
2
‖d(t)‖2,
where the last line follows from the inequality
‖x‖ ‖y‖ ≤ 1
2k
‖x‖2 + k
2
‖y‖2 ∀(x, y, k) ∈ (R2n × R>0).
(B.10)
Complete Lyapunov candidate: Finally, the Dini deriva-
tive of V is bounded as follows:
D+Vω +D
+Vθ ≤ −
(
1
2
− kcL4 − (σ + kcL6)L1
)
‖u˙‖2
−
(
1
2
− kcL5
)
‖λ˙‖2 − ka‖η˜‖2 −
(
1
2
− kcL8
)
‖e− η‖2
−
(
µσmin
2
− σmax(Γ)
2k3
− 1
2k4
− (σ − kcL6)L2
)
‖u˜‖2
−
(
kb − kcL7 − σmax(Γ)k3
2
)
‖θ˜‖2
+ kcL9‖d˙(t)‖2 + (σ + kcL6)L3‖F (u∗)‖2 + k4
2
‖d(t)‖2
5 −b1‖u˙‖2 − b2‖λ˙‖2 − ka‖η˜‖2b3 − b3‖e− η‖2 − b4‖u˜‖2
− b5‖θ˜‖2 + kcL9‖d˙(t)‖2 + (σ + kcL6)L3‖F (u∗)‖2
+
k4
2
‖d(t)‖2. (B.11)
Now, we can make the last three norms arbitrarily small
and b1, b2, b3 positive by choosing kc, σ and k4 small
enough, we can make b4 positive by choosing (σi) i∈I
small enough, we can make b5 positive by making kb
large enough. Of the mentioned parameters, only kb and
kc cannot be chosen arbitrarily. To make kb large enough,
we chose (Ki) i∈I and (ρi) i∈I large enough, to make
kc small enough we have to chose parameters k1 and
k2 small enough. Since Ωc was chosen for arbitrary c, it
follows that for any compact set K, it is possible to find
such control parameters that for (η(0), θˆ(0),u(0)) ∈ K,
(η˜, θ˜,u) converge to an arbitrarily small neighborhood
of (0, 0,u∗), which concludes the proof. For λ we can
only claim that this is bounded.
C Proof of Theorem 3
We have to prove that there exists a timescale separation
between the GNE learning scheme described in section
3 and dynamics of the multi-agent system in (25) such
that the interconnection is also stable. Let us consider a
Lyapunov function candidate V = Vθ + Vω + Vz, where
Vθ and Vω are the same as (B.1), (B.2) and Vz is formed
using Standing Assumption 4 in the following way:
Vz(z,u) =
∑
i∈I Vi(zi, ui). (C.1)
Outline of the proof: We first bound all of the terms in
D+Vz introduced by nonconstant inputs with functions
of the variables (η, θˆ, ω, z), then we bound all of the
terms in D+Vθ introduced by the redefinition of error
ei in (26) in the same manner. At the end, we use the
quadratic terms of the complete D+V to show that the
additional terms are majorized by the negative terms.
Multi-agent term: Let us do a change of variables
z = x− pi(u) in (25). New dynamics read as
z˙ = f(z + pi(u),u)− ∇pi(u)u˙. (C.2)
Dini derivative of (C.1), by plugging in (C.2), reads as
D+Vz(z,u) = ∇zV >z z˙ +∇uV >z u˙
=
1

∇zVz(z,u)>f(z + pi(u))
−∇zVz(z,u)>∇pi(u)u˙+∇uVz(z,u)>u˙
By using Standing Assumption 4 and inequality (B.10),
we can further improve the bound:
D+Vz(z,u) ≤ −κ

‖z‖2 + L10‖z‖‖u˙‖
≤ −
(
κ

− L10k5
2
)
‖z‖2 + L10
2k5
‖u˙‖2,
where L10 > 0 is the Lipshitz constant of the function
maxu∈U ∇uVz(z,u)−∇zVz(z,u)>∇pi(u) and k5 > 0.
Parameter estimation term: GNE learning is identical
as in the static case, apart from the measurements of
the cost function. Let us denote
l := col
(
(li)i∈I
)
,
y := col
(
(yi)i∈I
)
,
h(x) := col
(
(hi (ui,u−i))i∈I
)
.
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The difference in the measurement introduces an addi-
tional component in the bound for the derivative of the
Lyapunov function of the parameter estimation term:
‖η˜‖
∥∥∥y˙ − l˙∥∥∥ = ∥∥η˜‖‖ ddt (h(x)− h(pi(u)))∥∥
= ‖η˜‖
∥∥∥∥1∇h(x)f(x,u)−∇h(pi(u))∇pi(u)u˙
∥∥∥∥
≤ 1

‖η˜‖ ‖∇h(x)f(x,u)−∇h(x)f(pi(u),u)‖
+ ‖η˜‖ ‖∇h(pi(u))∇pi(u)u˙‖
≤ L11

‖η˜‖‖z‖+ L12‖η˜‖‖u˙‖
≤
(
L11k6
2
+
L12k7
2
)
‖η˜‖2 + L11
2k6
‖z‖2 + L12
2k7
‖u˙‖2,
where L11, L12, k7, k6 > 0 and the second to last
equation follows from the (local) Lipshitz continu-
ity of the functions and the fact that the variables
are bounded on a compact set Ωc := {(x, ω, ηˆ, θˆ) ∈
X × U × Rq × RN ×Θ | V (z, ω, η˜, θ˜) ≤ c}.
Complete Lyapunov candidate: Finally, the Dini deriva-
tive of the complete Lyapunov function candidate is
bounded as follows:
D+Vθ(ω) +D
+Vθ(ηˆ, θˆ) +D
+Vz(z,u)
≤ −
(
1
2
− kcL4 − (σ + kcL6)L1 − L10
2k5
− L12
2k7
)
‖u˙‖2
−
(
1
2
− kcL5
)
‖λ˙‖2 −
(
ka − L11k6
2
− L12k7
2
)
‖η˜‖2
−
(
kb − kcL7 − σmax(Γ)k3
2
)
‖θ˜‖2
−
(
µσmin
2
− σmax(Γ)
2k3
− 1
2k4
− (σ − kcL6)L2
)
‖u˜‖2
−
(
κ

− L10k5
2
− L11
2k6
)
‖z‖2 −
(
1
2
− kcL8
)
‖e− η‖2
+ kcL9‖d˙(t)‖2 + (σ + kcL6)L3‖F (u∗)‖+ k4
2
‖d(t)‖2
5 −b1‖u˙‖2 − b2‖λ˙‖2 − b3‖η˜‖2 − b4‖θ˜‖2 − b5‖u˜‖2
− b6‖z‖2 − b7‖e− η‖2 + b8‖F (u∗)‖2 + b9‖d˙(t)‖2
+ b10‖d(t)‖2. (C.3)
Now, we can make the b8, b9, b10 arbitrarily small and
b2, b7 positive by choosing kc, σ and k4 small enough, we
can make b1 positive by choosing k5, k7 large enough,
we can make b3 positive by choosing ka large enough,
we can make b4 positive by choosing kb large enough,
we can make b5 positive by choosing (σi) i∈I small
enough and we can make b6 positive by choosing 
small enough. Of the mentioned parameters, only ka,
kb and kc cannot be chosen arbitrarily. To make ka and
kb large enough, we chose (Ki) i∈I and (ρi) i∈I large
enough, to make kc small enough we have to chose pa-
rameters k1 and k2 small enough. Since Ωc was chosen
for arbitrary c, it follows that for any compact set K,
it is possible to find such control parameters that for
(η˜(0), θ˜(0),u(0), z(0)) ∈ K, (η˜, θ˜,u, z) converge to an
arbitrarily small neighborhood of (0, 0,u∗, 0), which
concludes the proof. For λ we can only claim that this
is bounded.
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